Medicare private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans are paid like other Medicare Advantage (MA) 
introduCtion
MA is the Medicare Program that pays private plans capitated rates to insure beneficiaries. The most familiar MA plan type is the HMO, but the program also includes preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and PFFS plans. PFFS plans assume risk like other MA plans but do not employ all the cost control mechanisms required of other MA plan types (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2007b) . In particular, they are not required to manage care or establish networks of pro viders. In addition PFFS plans must pay physicians at least the same rate as traditional Medicare (Blum, Brown, and Frieder, 2007; Miller, 2008) . Because PFFS plans do not build networks, they have been willing to enroll beneficiaries in rural areas that other MA plan types avoid due to the high costs of network contracting in those areas.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Im provement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), best known for establishing a Medicare outpatient drug benefit, also made significant changes to the MA pro gram. In the MMA, Congress created conditions favorable for rapid growth of MA plans in general and PFFS plans in particular. Between 2005 and 2006, PFFS enrollment increased 932 percent, while overall MA enrollment grew 37 percent (Gold, 2007a (Gold, , 2008 . The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that Medi care spending on PFFS plans will increase as a proportion of total MA spending from 21 to 30 percent between 2008 and 2017 (Orszag, 2007 The implications of PFFS growth and spending have caught the attention of Con gress and have raised questions about the value of PFFS relative to its cost (Neuman, 2007) . Each additional dollar in extra PFFS benefits has been estimated to cost Medicare $3 (Harrison and Zara bozo, 2008 (Iglehart, 2008) . Beginning in 2010, MIPPA will remove duplicative payments that MA plans receive for indirect medical education expenses. In 2011 MIPPA will rescind the PFFS pro vider network exemption in areas with at least two local network plans (HMOs or PPOs) (Congressional Budget Office, 2008; Biles, Adrion, and Guterman, 2008) . CBO estimated that these provisions will decrease MA enrollment in 2013 by 2.3 million beneficiaries relative to the pre MIPPA estimate of 14.3 million; Federal spending will fall by $47.5 billion over 2009 2018 (Orszag, 2008 (Gronniger and Sunshine, 2007) .
This article complements CBO's analy sis by estimating the effects of MedPAC and CBO proposals on PFFS availability and enrollment. We find that a payment rate cap of 100 percent of FFS costs would reduce PFFS plan participation by 85 per cent, potentially affecting about 1.9 million enrollees.
Study data and MetHodS
Our principal goal is to predict the effects of payment changes on the decisions of PFFSoffering firms to participate (enter) in Medicare. Our approach is to estimate a model of PFFS entry by firm, county, and year. Using this model, we simulate the effect of reduced payment rates. To do so, we created a yearcountyfirm level file from publicly available data on MA plan participation, enrollment, payment rates, organization names, benefits (2008 only), and FFS costs. 1 To these we merged data on Medigap premiums and variables from the Area Resource File (ARF). 2 These variables are used to control for PPFS plan cost and have been employed in prior work for similar purposes (Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin, 2005) .
Our sample frame included all U.S. counties, all firms that ever offered a PFFS product (excluding employeronly plans), and years 20012008 (2001 was the first full year of PFFS availability) (Gold, 2007b) . Except as indicated below, the analytic file contained one record for each combination of year, county, and PFFSoffering firm. We set an entry variable to one for records indicating a year and county in which a firm entered and zero otherwise.
We used a strict notion of entry: while a firm may contract with CMS to offer a plan in a county, we consider it to have entered only if it enrolled a meaningful number of beneficiaries. Our criteria for entry are enrollment of at least 11 individuals and at least 0.1 percent of beneficiaries in the county. The former is a functional definition: CMS reports enrollment below 11 as missing. The latter is consistent with techniques applied in prior work (Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin, 2005; Town and Liu, 2003; Frakt and Pizer, 2009; Pizer and Frakt, 2002 (Biles, Adrion, and Guterman, 2008) .
In Figure 1 , the benchmark to FFS cost ratio is weighted by countylevel counts of all Medicare beneficiaries and by PFFS enrollees. The former is what Medicare offers an MA plan on average to enroll a beneficiar y. The latter reflects PFFS en rollment patterns. Both measures are above 1.0 in ever y year, and since 2004, PFFS enrollmentweighted values are high er than beneficiar yweighted values re veal ing that PFFS enrollment is dis pro por tion ately drawn from highly paid counties relative to FFS. Table 1 reports the 2008 entry, en rollment, and nondrug benefits patterns for the top 10 PFFSoffering firms (en roll ment ranked) and, in aggregate, all other firms. Because our analysis ex cludes employeronly plans, the ranking differs from that reported elsewhere. 4 By our definition of entry (meaningful enrollment), no firm offers plans in all coun ties, three firms (Humana, Coventry, and Universal American) offer plans in over half the counties, and most are de cidedly subnational players (Table 1) .
National PFFS enrollment in 2008 of 2.2 million was concentrated among Humana with 0.7 million enrollees (Table 1) , and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, Cov en try, and Wellpoint, which collectively cap tured onethird of the market. PFFS enrollment in rural counties was a larg er share of total enrollment than is com mon for MA plans in general: 31 percent for PFFS (Table 1) and 11 percent for MA plans (Gold, 2008) .
In contrast to other MA plan types, which must offer at least one product with a drug benefit, PFFSoffering firms are not required to offer a drug benefit (Table 1) . Overall, 47 percent of countyplan pairs do not include a drug benefit. But this masks (Gold, 2007a) . 5 The considerable vari ation in firmlevel net premium is like ly due to variations in Part B rebates, dif ferences in benefit design (principally whether or not plans are bundled with a drug benefit), and variation in the geo graphic area over which different firms operate, which corresponds to variation in aver age perbeneficiary payment rate. Aver age doctor copayments are con sistent with those reported else where (Gold, 2007a) .
Figure 2 presents our simulations of the effects of changes in payment rates. The simulations were conducted using 2008 data based on the entry model described in the Technical Note. In each successive simulation, we capped the county payment rate at a lower level, starting at 115 percent and ending at 95 percent of county FFS cost, the rate prior to the passage of the 1997 BBA. Since the actual enrolleeweighted average 2008 benchmark/FFS value is 119 percent (Figure 1 ), all simulations reduce PFFS entry relative to current law. In particular, MedPAC's proposal to pay 100 percent of FFS cost would reduce entry by 85 percent. Assuming a proportional reduction in enrollment, about 1.9 million current PFFS enrollees would have to select another MA plan or switch to traditional FFS Medicare.
diSCuSSion
Recent congressionally mandated pay ment rate increases have stimulated PFFS enrollment and provoked calls for policy change. In recent annual reports to Con gress, MedPAC has cautioned that higher payments to MA plans, including PFFS plans, increase Medicare costs and beneficiary Part B premiums. MedPAC has recommended parity between MA payment rates and FFS cost, and CBO has evaluated the budgetary implications of cutting payments to PFFS plans. With the passage of MIPPA, Congress signaled an intention to reverse some of the effects of earlier ratesetting statutes while continuing to consider further measures.
This article makes two empirical con tributions to this debate. First, we provide the first time series (20012009) of bench mark payment rates as a proportion of FFS cost for PFFS plans. In the existing literature, this number is only available for 2006 and 2008. Second, we evaluate the impact of payment rate cuts on PFFS entry and enrollment, complementing the CBO's (Gronniger and Sunshine, 2007) . PFFS plans do have other options in the face of payment cuts. They could re duce benefits. This, as opposed to exit, is more likely for small reductions in the benchmark relative to FFS cost. However, at the margin there will be exits with any size cut in payment. Reducing payments to or near FFS cost essentially returns to rates offered at a time when PFFS was a permitted plan type but actual PFFS entry was tiny. This descriptive evidence strongly suggests that plan exit and not benefits changes will be the dominant response to large changes in payment.
While our analysis is limited to PFFS, it is unlikely Congress would cut payments to PFFS plans while leaving payments to other MA plans intact. Therefore, parity between payment rates and FFS cost would have larger implications for Medicare, MA plans, and beneficiaries than we have described.
Of course, the provision of MIPPA scheduled for 2011 that will remove the PFFS provider network exemption in areas with at least two local network plans will have a large impact on PFFS without affecting other MA plans. Using our study data and CBO methodology, we estimate that had the network exemption repeal occurred in 2008, it would have caused about half of PFFS plans to exit the market, affecting 1.4 million enrollees (Bradley, 2008) . Our results suggest that a cut in payments to 100 percent of FFS cost implemented before MIPPA's adjustment of the PFFS network exemption (i.e., in 2010) would render MIPPA's affect moot. On the other hand, if payments are cut after MIPPA is in effect they would induce a further reduction in the number of PFFS plans and enrollees beyond what would be caused by MIPPA alone.
Current fiscal constraints will likely mean less money for private Medicare plans (Krugman, 2008) . As the fastest growing and most costly plan type, PFFS plans already are viewed as a potential source for savings. As we have illustrated, payment cuts have the potential to effectively shut down the PFFS market, making PFFS a particularly vivid illustration of the con sequences of managing markets through congressional ratesetting. After creating explosive growth in PFFS en rollment, mem bers of Congress will have to weigh the likely disruption and lost benefits for beneficiaries against predicted savings as they consider reversing course.
teCHniCal note
We estimated a logit model of PFFS en try with clustering on firm to adjust stand ard errors for firmspecific heteroscedasticity. Because lagged paymenttoFFS cost ratios are included in the model, 2001 data are omitted, reducing the sample to 238,358 yearcountyfirm obser vations. Lags are included in the model because plans did not respond to payment incentives instantaneously (Figure 1 ). Simulations assume that payment caps are set per manently so lags and current values are equal. Variables are defined in Table 2 ; mean values, model coef ficients and marginal effects are provided in Table 3 . 
